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In this paper, we introduce the fairness approach to efficiency wages into a standard model of 
international fragmentation. This gives us a theoretical framework in which wage inequality 
and unemployment rates are co-determined and therefore the public concern can be addressed 
that international fragmentation and outsourcing to low wage countries lead to domestic job-
losses. We develop a novel diagrammatic tool to illustrate the main labour market effects of 
international fragmentation. We also explore how preferences for fair wages and the size of 
unemployment benefits govern the employment effects of outsourcing and critically assess 
the role of political intervention that aims to reduce unemployment benefits under 
internationally fragmented production. 
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International fragmentation is a key aspect of modern industrial production and has there-
fore sparked a lot of interest in the academic literature and the popular press. Krugman
(1995, p. 331) notes that “it is hard to argue that the sheer volume of trade (...) marks
a qualitative diﬀerence from previous experience”. Rather it is the composition of trade
in general and the share of intermediate goods in particular that makes the recent wave
of globalisation so diﬀerent from globalisation a hundred years ago (Feenstra and Hanson,
2004). Grossman and Helpman (2005, p. 115) articulate the common view by stating:
“We live in an age of outsourcing”.1
The public debate on international fragmentation has so far predominantly focused
on outsourcing of labour intensive production processes to low wage countries in Asia or
Eastern Europe and its adverse eﬀects on unskilled workers in industrialised countries.
This phenomenon has revived the discussion among economists on whether it is technical
progress or some form of globalisation that can explain recent labour market developments
observed in the Western Europe and the U.S. Empirical ﬁndings in Feenstra and Hanson
(1999, p. 938) “(...) support the idea that both foreign outsourcing and expenditures
on computers have played a role in the increase of the relative wage for nonproduction
workers”. Moreover, they stress that “trade in intermediate inputs can have an impact
on wages and employment that is much greater than for trade in ﬁnal consumer goods”
(2004, p. 147), since much of the recent growth of trade is attributable to outsourcing
of component production and transactions of intermediate goods. When trade takes this
form, it substantially changes the process of home production, with labour market conse-
quences, which are similar to those observed under (factor-biased) technical change (ibid,
p. 177). These insights have stimulated a theoretical discussion on the labour market ef-
1Throughout this paper, we use the two terms “international fragmentation” and “outsourcing” syn-
onymously. For empirical evidence on the magnitude and growth of intermediate goods transactions
associated with international fragmentation, see Hummels et al. (2001) and Yeats (2001). In a seminal
paper, Yi (2003) calibrates a two-country dynamic Ricardian model of vertical specialisation to highlight
the relevance of international fragmentation in explaining the growth of world trade after World War II.
2fects of international fragmentation. Interestingly however, although in the perception of
the general public it is the employment eﬀects rather than the wage eﬀects of international
fragmentation that are important, almost all theoretical studies on outsourcing have built
upon the assumption of perfectly competitive factor markets.2 A framework that allows
for co-determination of the skill premium and the unemployment rate is so far missing in
the literature. To close this gap is the purpose of this paper.
There is a bulk of literature dealing with the relative factor price eﬀects of international
fragmentation. While Feenstra and Hanson (1996a) have pointed to a factor bias eﬀect
of outsourcing in a one-sector model, Arndt (1997) has shown in a two-sector framework
that outsourcing of labour intensive activities may be beneﬁcial for unskilled workers if
it occurs in the sector with labour intensive production. This indicates a sector bias in
the wage eﬀects of international fragmentation. Indeed a number of diﬀerent outcomes
can be generated, including “some curious cases” (Venables, 1999). In the following years,
economists have tried to identify a general principle which is at work, when international
fragmentation aﬀects factor prices. Egger and Falkinger (2003) point to the interaction of
a cost-saving and a factor-intensity eﬀect, which together determine the production pat-
tern under outsourcing and the distributional consequences of international fragmentation.
Independently of them, Kohler (2003) has drawn a similar conclusion from a multi-sector
model.
Empirical evidence supports the common view that international fragmentation has
substantial eﬀects on relative wages in favour of skilled workers. Feenstra and Hanson
(1996b, 1999) identify a positive impact of international fragmentation on the skill pre-
mium in the U.S., while Hijzen et al. (2002) and Hijzen (2003) provide similar results for
the U.K. Even in continental European countries with strong labour market institutions,
outsourcing may exhibit signiﬁcant relative wage eﬀects. Geishecker and G¨ org (2004) use
the German Socio-Economic Household Panel to show that international fragmentation
reduces the real wage for workers in the lowest skill categories, while it increases real wages
2The focus of the public debate on unemployment rather than wages clearly follows from casual obser-
vation of the popular press on both sides of the Atlantic. For more evidence in the case of the U.S., see
Scheve and Slaughter (2001).
3for (highly) skilled workers.
There is also (at least indirect) support for the public concern that international frag-
mentation may have detrimental employment eﬀects (see, e.g., Egger and Egger, 2003a),
a phenomenon that cannot be addressed in orthodox models of international fragmenta-
tion with perfectly competitive factor markets. However, to the best of our knowledge,
the existing studies focus on employment in manufacturing industries, while a rigorous
assessment of the nexus between international fragmentation and (economy-wide) unem-
ployment rates is so far missing in the literature.3 Despite the lack of well documented
empirical evidence, it is this nexus which dominates the public discussion on outsourcing
and therefore requires a better understanding of the main economic mechanisms at work.
International fragmentation can only impact on the unemployment rate if there are
imperfections in the labour market. From a theoretical point of view, diﬀerent sources of
such imperfections can be distinguished: insider/outsider or trade union models, minimum
or eﬃciency wages, etc. To our knowledge, there are three studies that analyze interna-
tional fragmentation in a setting with imperfect labour markets, all of which focus on the
role of trade union activities. Gaston (2002) investigates how outsourcing opportunities
aﬀect the nature of collective bargaining. Access to international fragmentation raises
the outside options of ﬁrms and thereby worsens the bargaining position of unions. But
international fragmentation does not occur in the bargaining equilibrium analyzed in this
paper. Egger and Egger (2003a) consider bargaining on unskilled wages in a one-sector
model but their analysis builds upon an ad hoc representation of the wage-setting curve
without any details of the wage determination process. Skaksen (2004) presents a model
of international fragmentation in the presence of trade unions. However, two restrictive
assumptions are imposed. First, there is only one sector of production, which rules out any
sector bias in the employment level eﬀects and, second, there is only one type of labour,
3In the 1990s almost all Western European countries were characterized by a sharp increase of interna-
tional fragmentation, mainly in the form of outsourcing to low-wage Central and Eastern Europe (Egger
and Egger, 2003a; 2003b). However, at the same time, these countries experienced quite diﬀerent devel-
opments in their unemployment ﬁgures. While unemployment rates increased in Italy and Germany, they
declined in Denmark and the Netherlands, and remained rather stable in Austria (OECD statistics).
4so that skill premium and unemployment eﬀects cannot be addressed simultaneously.
Motivated by strong microeconometric and experimental evidence, we choose a dif-
ferent approach and consider a variant of the eﬃciency wage model, where the eﬃciency
wage is derived from a fairness constraint (see Solow, 1979; Akerlof, 1982, and Akerlof
and Yellen, 1988, 1990).4 In this case, worker eﬀort depends on the perceived fairness of
the wage, i.e. on the wage paid by the ﬁrm relative to the wage workers consider to be
fair. The fair wage is a weighted average of the income attainable outside the job and
the wage of the other skill group. It is an important implication of this framework that
the fairness constraint is binding for the unskilled workers, giving rise to unemployment
of this group, while skilled labour is fully employed in equilibrium.
We combine the fair wage model with the outsourcing framework suggested by Jones
(2000) and Jones and Kierzkowski (2001). This accounts for three potential sectors of
production and two primary factor inputs (skilled and unskilled labour).5 The model
gives us a powerful tool to investigate the impact of international fragmentation on both
the skill premium and the unemployment rate. Moreover, it allows us to disentangle cost-
saving and factor-intensity eﬀects of outsourcing and to address non-marginal eﬀects that
change the output mix in the economy of interest.6 Following most of the theoretical
literature on international fragmentation, we consider a small open economy and rule out
any adjustments in ﬁnal goods prices.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a model of
fair wages and international fragmentation and characterises the unemployment eﬀects
4Fehr et al. (1993) remark that their “two-stage market experiment may be viewed as (...) a test
of Akerlof and Yellen’s eﬃciency wage approach” (p. 438) and, when summarizing their ﬁndings, they
conclude that the “results provide evidence for the validity of the fair wage-eﬀort hypothesis” (p. 453).
See Howitt (2002) and Bewley (2002) for an overview on further evidence.
5For an application of the fair wage model in a setting with more than one production sector, see Agell
and Lundborg (1995), Grossmann (2000), and Kreickemeier and Nelson (2005).
6In this respect, Jones and Kierzkowski (2001, p. 28) argue that “the process of fragmentation is deﬁ-
nitely not a marginal phenomenon.” And in explaining why the standard Heckscher-Ohlin logic fails when
thinking about the distributional consequences of international fragmentation, Jones (2000) emphasizes
that foreign outsourcing of component production changes the production pattern of an economy.
5of outsourcing. Section 3 discusses how the eﬀects of international fragmentation diﬀer
in egalitarian and non-egalitarian economies. Section 4 looks at the eﬀects of changing
unemployment beneﬁts on wages and employment and compares these eﬀects for the cases
of integrated and internationally fragmented production. Section 5 concludes.
2 A Model of Fragmentation and Unemployment
2.1 Integrated production
We look at a small open economy potentially producing the three goods X, Y and Z.
Product markets are perfectly competitive, and production functions in all sectors exhibit
constant returns to scale. For simplicity, the production technology in all sectors is as-
sumed to be Leontief. Furthermore, good X is the good with the highest skill intensity
and good Z the one with the lowest skill intensity. There are two factors of production,
skilled labour H and unskilled labour L, both of which are supplied inelastically. Let wL
denote the wage of unskilled labour, wH the wage of skilled labour, and Pi the price of
good i. In equilibrium, unit costs cannot be smaller than goods prices, i.e.
cX(wL,wH) ≥ PX cY (wL,wH) ≥ PY cZ(wL,wH) ≥ PZ, (1)
where the strict equality holds for those goods that are produced in equilibrium.
The conditions for non-positive proﬁts are conveniently visualised using the Lerner-
Pearce (LP) diagram in ﬁgure 1. X, Y and Z denote unit-value isoquants for the respective
goods, i.e. combinations of H and L that give one Euro worth of output. The unit isocost
line tangent to X and Y gives combinations of H and L that cost one Euro and are
therefore compatible with zero proﬁts in both sectors X and Y . The inverses of the
resulting factor prices are given by the intersection points of the unit isocost line with
the respective factor axis. Analogous reasoning allows us to determine the factor prices
compatible with zero proﬁts in the production of Y and Z.
The convex hull of X, Y and Z, known as the Hicksian composite unit-value isoquant,
together with the relative skill-to-labour endowment would suﬃce to determine production
6patterns and factor prices in the full employment model: For endowment ratios strictly
between the skill intensities of X and Z, goods X and Y (Y and Z) are produced if the
endowment ratio is higher (lower) than the skill intensity of Y , and factor prices can be
read oﬀ the respective part of the Hicksian composite unit-value isoquant. Endowment
ratios more extreme than the factor intensities of X or Z lead to full specialisation in the
production of the respective good, while full specialisation on Y occurs if the endowment
ratio coincides with the skill intensity of Y . This well-known standard reasoning has to
be modiﬁed here due to the existence of unemployment.

























Figure 1: Unemployment in the LP diagram
In order to illustrate how the LP diagram can be used in the present context, deﬁne
¯ h ≡ ¯ H/¯ L as the endowment ratio between skilled and unskilled labour and h as the
respective employment ratio. As set out in the introductory section, the equilibrium of
7the present model is characterised by full employment of skilled labour, while there is
unemployment of unskilled labour. Let the unemployment rate for unskilled labour be





and therefore we have h > ¯ h if U > 0. Denote the skill intensity of good-i production by
hi,i = X,Y,Z. Then, the economy produces X and Y if hX(1−U) > ¯ h > hY (1−U), and
it produces Y and Z if hY (1−U) > ¯ h > hZ(1−U). For endowment ratios of hX(1−U) or
higher (hZ(1−U) or lower) the economy specialises in the production of good X (good Z).
The economy specialises on producing good Y if the endowment ratio equals hY (1 − U).
No assumption has been made so far on how U is determined and whether it is constant
across regimes. For illustrative purposes however, assume for the moment an exogenous
level of U that is constant for all equilibrium factor prices. Using this assumption, the
boundaries between production patterns are depicted in ﬁgure 1. In comparison with the
full employment model, they are rotated clockwise with the extent of rotation depending
on the rate of unemployment. We now move to showing how in our model U is determined
in general equilibrium.
Following Kreickemeier and Nelson (2005), involuntary unemployment is generated by
a variant of the fair wage mechanism used by Akerlof and Yellen (1990). Both types of
workers are able to choose their eﬀort ε at work. In doing so, they take into account
the eﬀort norm εn. For a worker of group k, we assume the additively separable utility
function
ν = v(X,Y,Z) + ∆εk (3)
where ∆εk ≡ −|εk − εn
k| is the degree of norm violation. Hence, for all consumption
bundles a worker of type k maximises utility by choosing εk = εn










k = L,H (4)
8where w∗
k denotes the fair wage for workers of group k. Together, (3) and (4) imply that
workers provide the normal level of eﬀort, which is normalised to one, if they are paid at
least their fair wage.7
Firms are wage setters but they are assumed to treat the fair wage, which is determined
in general equilibrium, parametrically. Under this assumption, proﬁt maximisation can be
thought of as a two-stage process, just as in the standard eﬃciency wage model of Solow
(1979). In step one, ﬁrms set the wage rate for each type of labour k to minimise the wage
paid for an eﬃciency unit, which is wk/εk. In step two, they hire workers up to the point
where the value marginal product of labour is equal to the wage set in step one. It can
be seen from (4) together with εk = εn
k that the wage rate for an eﬃciency unit of labour
(skilled or unskilled) stays constant (at w∗
H and w∗
L, respectively) if a ﬁrm pays a wage
below the fair wage. We can therefore safely assume, following Akerlof and Yellen (1990),
that ﬁrms choose to pay wages at least as high as the fair wage for the respective factor.
For each of the two groups, the fair wage has two determinants: ﬁrst the market wage
of the respective other group, and second the remuneration they could expect outside their
own job, taking into account that they might be unemployed with a probability that is
7Equations (3) and (4) build upon two assumptions, which are essential for all fair wage-eﬀort models.
First, workers punish wages lower than those considered to be fair by providing lower eﬀort, a behaviour
which is often referred to by the term negative reciprocity. There is strong support for the reciprocity of
workers by experimental evidence (Fehr and G¨ achter, 2000) and surveys on manager interviews (Bewley,
2002). Second, workers do not increase their eﬀort in response to overpayment. This hypothesis has been
studied in psychological experiments. The respective ﬁndings can be summarized in the words of Akerlof
and Yellen (1990): “These experimental results are consistent with the hypothesis that overpayment does
not increase input” (p. 258). Bewley (2002) also gives (at least indirect) support to the second assumption
by concluding from survey results that “productivity and morale do not increase with pay levels though
they can be hurt by pay reductions.” (p. 9)
9equal to the factor-speciﬁc rate of unemployment.8 Hence, we have
w∗
L = θwH + (1 − θ)(1 − UL)wL (5)
w∗
H = θwL + (1 − θ)(1 − UH)wH (6)
where UL and UH are the factor-speciﬁc rates of unemployment, and θ is the weight
attached to the remuneration of the other skill group in one factor’s determination of
its fair wage. Equations (5) and (6) do not account for payments to the unemployed.
The impact of redistributive measures like unemployment beneﬁts is analysed in detail in
Section 4.
We assume that in a perfectly competitive labour market the wage for skilled workers
would be higher than the wage for unskilled workers. Under this condition it is straight-
forward to see that the following must be true in equilibrium:
UL > UH = 0 (7)
wH > w∗
H > wL = w∗
L (8)
εL = εH = 1 (9)
i.e., there is a strictly positive rate of unemployment U = UL for unskilled workers but
full employment for skilled workers, the fair wage is binding only for unskilled workers,
and both types of workers provide the normal eﬀort.9
According to (7) and (8), equation (6) is not binding. By setting wL = w∗
L in (5) and
solving for ω ≡ wL/wH, we get
ω = f(U,θ) ≡
θ
θ + (1 − θ)U
. (10)
Following Akerlof and Yellen (1990), the equilibrium relationship between the wage dif-
ferential and the rate of unemployment in (10) is called the fair wage constraint. For a
8Instead of the expected wage rate, Akerlof and Yellen (1990) use the (hypothetical) market clearing
wage rate of the respective group as the second determinant of the fair wage. The two approaches yield sim-
ilar results as in the presence of involuntary unemployment for the respective factor both its expected wage
and its market clearing wage lie below the actual wage. The approach used here is more straightforward
to apply in a multi-sector model.
9These results are the same as in the model of Akerlof and Yellen (1990).
10given value of θ, the fair wage constraint describes equilibrium combinations between the
rate of unemployment of unskilled workers and the relative wages of skilled and unskilled





(θ + (1 − θ)U)





(θ + (1 − θ)U)
3 > 0,
and hence the fair wage constraint is negatively sloped and convex in ω − U-space, i.e.
higher rates of unemployment for unskilled workers lead ﬁrms to paying them relatively
lower wages. This is because with higher rates of unemployment, the fair wage needed to
elicit normal eﬀort from unskilled workers is lower. Considering the extreme cases U = 0
and U = 1, we have f(0,θ) = 1 and f(1,θ) = θ, respectively. Hence, wages can vary over
the range [θ,1], and the model gives us an intermediate case between full wage ﬂexibility
and a ﬁxed wage diﬀerential.10 For future reference, we introduce the inverse fair wage
constraint. It follows from (10) as






In order to describe the equilibrium production structure for the fair wage model in
the case of integrated production, in ﬁgure 2 we introduce a novel four-quadrant diagram
that merges a graphical representation of the fair wage constraint with the LP diagram
of ﬁgure 1. The LP diagram is shown in the ﬁrst quadrant, with the Hicksian composite
unit-value isoquant traced out in bold.
Quadrant II depicts the function mapping the wage diﬀerential ω into 1/wH. Trivially,
it is a linear function with slope wL. Note however that wL, which can be determined
as illustrated in ﬁgure 1, is speciﬁc to the specialisation pattern, so that a change in the
specialisation pattern rotates this function. Quadrant III shows the fair wage constraint,
while the linear function L = ¯ L−¯ LU in the fourth quadrant relates the level of employment
for unskilled labour to the unemployment rate, for a given endowment ¯ L. Together,
quadrants II to IV allow us to depict both endowment and employment quantities in the
LP diagram of quadrant I.
10With perfectly competitive markets for both types of labour, ω can vary between 0 and 1, assuming –
as we did – that under perfect competition skilled workers are paid the higher wage.
11Note that factor prices in equilibrium have to be compatible with both the zero proﬁt
conditions and the fair wage constraint. Factor prices leading to zero proﬁts in the produc-
tion of Y and Z are compatible with the fair wage constraint for an unemployment rate
equal to U1 = ˜ f(ωY Z,θ), where ωij is the relative wage rate compatible with zero proﬁts
in the production of goods i and j. Hence, the economy specialises in the production of
Y and Z if h1 = hY (1 − U1) > ¯ h > hZ(1 − U1).


























Figure 2: Equilibrium under integrated production
On the other hand, with specialisation in the production of X and Y , the unemploy-
ment rate is equal to U2 = ˜ f(ωXY ,θ) < U1.11 Consequently, the economy produces these
11With a more skill intensive production mix, zero proﬁt conditions require a higher relative wage of
unskilled workers, and hence a lower rate of unemployment is needed to make this relative wage compatible
with the fair wage constraint.
12two goods whenever hX(1 − U2) > ¯ h > hY (1 − U2) = h2. For endowment ratios between
h1 and h2 the economy specialises in the production of Y . We call this region of speciali-
sation on the good with intermediate skill intensity, which is shaded in ﬁgure 2, the cone
of non-diversiﬁcation (NDIV cone).12 Inside the NDIV cone, for each endowment ratio
the equilibrium unemployment rate ¯ U follows from (2) as ¯ U = 1 − (¯ h/hY ), and the wage
diﬀerential is given by ω = f(¯ U,θ), according to (10).
The existence of an NDIV cone as deﬁned here is guaranteed only for suﬃciently low
values of the fairness parameter θ, which – as shown earlier – is the lower bound of the
wage diﬀerential compatible with the fairness constraint. More precisely, the NDIV cone
exists if and only if θ is smaller than ωY Z (see ﬁgure 2). For ωXY > θ > ωY Z, there is
an NDIV region (which is not a cone). The economy will in this case specialise in the
production of Y for ¯ h < h2. For θ > ωXY , not even an NDIV region exists, and the
economy specialises in the production of good X for all relative factor endowments.
The fact that, irrespective of the relative skill endowment, labour-intensive production
processes may become infeasible (if θ is suﬃciently high) is an important feature of the
fair wage model. However, since we are interested in the full set of general equilibrium
interactions between endowments and production patterns, we ignore the latter two cases
by assuming that θ is suﬃciently small to guarantee the existence of an NDIV cone.
2.2 Fragmented Production
Now we assume that the production process for Y , the good with the intermediate skill
intensity, can be split up into the production of components A and B, which in turn can
be assembled without incurring an additional cost.13 In our three-good setup, focusing on
the fragmentation in the production process of good Y – rather than the “extreme” goods
X or Z – is arguably the most interesting case because it allows us to distinguish between
two situations of diversiﬁed production: one where the fragmented production process as
12In the full employment model with Leontief production functions this cone would have measure zero.
This is true as well for a model with a constant rate of unemployment, as illustrated in ﬁgure 1.
13Assuming that international fragmentation occurs only in one sector is meaningful, as from an empirical
point of view outsourcing opportunities are not (equally) prevalent in all industries.
13a whole is more skill intensive than the other good produced (hY > hZ), and one where
it is less skill intensive (hY < hX). As it will turn out, this distinction is crucial for many
of the results in this paper.14
Let the world market prices for the two components be denoted by PA and PB, re-
spectively. In analogy to the integrated production case, the absence of positive proﬁts
requires
ci(wL,wH) ≥ Pi ∀i ∈ {A,B,X,Y,Z} (12)
where again the strict equality holds for those goods or components that are produced in
equilibrium. In analogy to the other production processes, Leontief technology is assumed
for the production of components A and B. We restrict our analysis to the situation where
(i) production of one of the two components is retained domestically,
(ii) for relevant (zero-proﬁt consistent) factor prices, fragmented production technology
is strictly preferred over integrated production technology, once it is available,
(iii) both X and Z production remain viable for some h,
(iv) the skill intensity of the domestically produced fragment lies between hX and hZ,
and
(v) good Y is produced in the pre-fragmentation equilibrium.
Conditions (i) to (v) serve the purpose of concentrating on what are arguably the eco-
nomically interesting cases. In principle, it would be easy to specify world market prices
for the two components such that the economy produces both or neither of them (see,
e.g., Jones 2000). By condition (i) we exclude these cases from the analysis, as from the
point of view of the home country neither of them involves international fragmentation of
14This distinction refers to the so-called sector bias of international fragmentation (see Arndt, 1997; and
Egger and Falkinger, 2003).
14production, the phenomenon we are interested in.15 Condition (ii) excludes the borderline
case of two technologies surviving in the Y sector (Egger and Falkinger, 2003). Condition
(iii) says that technology and price for the fragment produced domestically must not be
such that either X or Z production is infeasible for all values of h.















Figure 3: Fragmentation in the LP diagram
Condition (iv) rules out the possibility of a change in the factor intensity ranking of
sectors (Egger and Falkinger, 2003), so that production of good X (Z) is the most (least)
skill-intensive activity under both integrated production and international fragmentation
of Y -manufacturing. Finally, the opportunity of international fragmentation may make
15Of course, one may hypothesize costless assembling at home if production of both components is
outsourced to a foreign economy. Such a scenario would be in line with Feenstra and Hanson’s (1996b)
measure of outsourcing, which includes “... goods that are produced entirely by subcontractors, with the
U.S. manufacturer attaching its brandname to the ﬁnished product”(p. 242). In contrast, we speak of
outsourcing if some (residual) production is provided at home.
15production of component A proﬁtable although integrated production of Y is unproﬁtable
(see Egger and Falkinger, 2003). However, given assumption (iv) it is obvious that in the
case of full specialization on skill-intensive good X (labour-intensive good Z) in the pre-
fragmentation equilibrium, international fragmentation and domestic production of one
component of Y would reduce (raise) overall employment ratio h and therefore decrease
(increase) the rate of unemployment. Since this result is straightforward, we exclude this
scenario in the following analysis.
The restrictions that conditions (i) to (v) impose can be seen graphically in ﬁgure 3.
For concreteness, we label as A the component for which production is retained domes-
tically. Then point A, giving the eﬃcient combination of H and L to produce one Euro
worth of fragment A, lies in the shaded area X0Y Z0C, and the analogous point B for the
other fragment lies strictly above XAZ, the Hicksian composite unit value isoquant under
fragmentation.16
The equilibrium with international fragmentation is depicted in ﬁgure 4, which is
constructed analogously to ﬁgure 2. The ﬁgure is drawn for a case where the skill intensity
of fragment A is higher than the skill intensity of the integrated production of good Y . The
NDIV cone for the fragmentation scenario (NDIVF), bounded by h3 and h4, is given by
the shaded area. For comparison, the NDIV cone from the integrated production scenario
(NDIVI) is replicated as the region bounded by h1 and h2. It can be seen that diversiﬁed
production of X and A yields a lower skill premium 1/ω and a lower rate of unemployment
than diversiﬁed production of X and Y in the pre-fragmentation equilibrium. On the
other hand, diversiﬁed production of A and Z yields a higher skill premium and a higher
rate of unemployment than diversiﬁed production of Y and Z in the pre-fragmentation
equilibrium.
This observation alone implies that fragmentation decreases unemployment for suﬃ-
ciently high employment ratios (those that lead to production of XA after fragmentation)
and increases unemployment for suﬃciently low employment ratios (those that lead to
16Areas XY X
0 and Y ZZ
0 are ruled out by assumption (ii), while area XCZ0 is ruled out by assumption
(iii). Factor intensities above h
X and factor intensities below h
Z contradict assumption (iv). The position
of point Y below the line connecting X and Z follows from assumption (v).
16production of AZ after fragmentation).17 While this result is useful as a ﬁrst insight,
it leaves a lot to be desired. First, it is stated in terms of employment ratios that are
themselves endogenous. Second, it is not informative for the case of full specialisation on
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Figure 4: Equilibrium under fragmented production
Further insights into these questions can be gained by writing the unemployment rates
under integrated and fragmented production, UI and UF, as a function of the endowment
ratio ¯ h. Considering θ < ωXA (i.e., assuming that an NDIV cone under integrated and
17Of course, this result extends to a scenario with full specialization on X or Z in the pre-fragmentation
equilibrium, which has been ruled out by assumption (v).
18Kohler (2003) shows that under full employment the particular factor market eﬀects of international
fragmentation depend on the factor intensities of the remaining domestic activities.
17fragmented production exists), and noting assumptions (i)-(v), this gives:
UI =

    
    
˜ f(ωXY ,θ) for ¯ h ≥ hY (1 − ˜ f(ωXY ,θ))
1 −
¯ h
hY for hY (1 − ˜ f(ωXY ,θ)) > ¯ h > hY (1 − ˜ f(ωY Z,θ))




    
    
˜ f(ωXA,θ) for ¯ h ≥ hA(1 − ˜ f(ωXA,θ))
1 −
¯ h
hA for hA(1 − ˜ f(ωXA,θ)) > ¯ h > hA(1 − ˜ f(ωAZ,θ))
˜ f(ωAZ,θ) for ¯ h ≤ hA(1 − ˜ f(ωAZ,θ))
(14)
It is easily veriﬁed that both UI and UF are weakly decreasing in ¯ h and continuous.
Furthermore, we have
˜ f(ωAZ,θ) > ˜ f(ωY Z,θ) > ˜ f(ωXY ,θ) > ˜ f(ωXA,θ), (15)
irrespective of the relative size of hY and hA. This implies that there is a critical level
of ¯ h, labelled ¯ h∗ and not necessarily unique, that separates endowment ratios for which
international fragmentation increases unemployment from those where it decreases unem-
ployment. In deriving a more speciﬁc result, the following observation is useful:
Lemma 1. The critical endowment ratio ¯ h∗ lies inside NDIVF.
Proof. From (15), UI lies between ˜ f(ωY Z,θ) and ˜ f(ωXY ,θ). From (14), UF can only fall
in this range if it is determined by 1 − (¯ h∗/hA). This in turn is true if and only if ¯ h∗ lies
inside NDIVF.
In view of lemma 1, we can describe the properties of the critical endowment ratio ¯ h∗ in
more detail:
Proposition 1. The critical endowment ratio ¯ h∗ is unique if and only if hY 6= hA. For
given hY , a higher hA is associated with a higher ¯ h∗.
Proof. We have to distinguish three possible regimes, namely the ones where ¯ h∗ lies above,
below, and inside NDIVI. For ¯ h∗ to be above NDIVI, we must have 1 − (¯ h∗/hA) =
18˜ f(ωXY ,θ) and hence ¯ h∗ = hA(1 − ˜ f(ωXY ,θ)). From (13), this implies hA > hY . Analo-
gously, we get ¯ h∗ = hA(1− ˜ f(ωY Z,θ)) for ¯ h∗ below NDIVI, with hA < hY in this case. In
both regimes, ¯ h∗ can be seen to be unique and increasing in hA. With ¯ h∗ inside NDIVI,
we have 1−(¯ h∗/hA) = 1−(¯ h∗/hY ) and hence hA = hY . In this case, ¯ h∗ is not unique but
can take on any value inside NDIVI. All ¯ h∗ values consistent with hY = hA are strictly
higher (lower) than ¯ h∗ values consistent with hY > hA (hY < hA).
Concerning the unemployment eﬀects of fragmentation, we can state the following result:
Proposition 2. International fragmentation increases (decreases) unemployment for en-
dowment ratios lower than (higher than) ¯ h∗.
Proof. Proposition 2 follows from (13)-(15) and proposition 1.
The intuition for propositions 1 and 2 can be illustrated by means of ﬁgure 4, which
depicts the critical endowment ratio ¯ h∗ for the case where hA exceeds hY . As shown in
the proof to proposition 1, it is given by ¯ h∗ = hA(1 − U2), where U2 = ˜ f(ωXY ,θ). As ¯ h∗
lies above NDIVI, the economy specialises on X and Y under integrated production. With
the implied unemployment rate U2, the average skill intensity of production is equal to
hA. Under fragmentation, as ¯ h∗ lies in NDIVF, the economy specialises in the production
of A, and hence the skill intensity of production in this case is hA as well. This implies
that the two unemployment rates are equal. For skill intensities exceeding ¯ h∗ but still
inside NDIVF, the average skill intensity under integrated production exceeds hA, while it
is equal to hA under fragmented production. Hence, fragmentation in this case decreases
the average skill intensity of production and unemployment of unskilled workers. Other
cases can be illustrated using analogous reasoning. Note that decreasing hA rotates NDIVF
clockwise and leaves NDIVI unchanged. As long as hA > hY , ¯ h∗ lies above NDIVI.
In a next step, we use our diagrammatic tool presented in ﬁgures 2 and 4 to inves-
tigate two policy issues of general public interest. In section 3, we address the role of
egalitarian and non-egalitarian attitudes towards wage inequality to get insights into how
fairness preferences can aﬀect the implications of international fragmentation for the rate
19of unemployment. Unemployment beneﬁts as an indicator of the generosity of the welfare
state are at the agenda in section 4.
3 International Fragmentation in Egalitarian and
Non-Egalitarian Economies
It is a view held by many economists that strong preferences for an egalitarian wage
schedule are an important determinant of high European unemployment rates. However,
the theoretical debate on the labour market implications of international fragmentation
is usually based on the assumption of perfectly competitive labour markets, which makes
a formal analysis of this factor impossible. Since wages and unemployment rates are
co-determined in our model, we can address the interaction between international frag-
mentation and the attitude towards wage inequality and investigate its labour market
consequences. To do this, we consider diﬀerent values of the fairness parameter θ. From
(10) we have ∂f/∂θ > 0, which says that given the rate of unemployment a marginal
increase of θ increases the value of ω which is needed in order to elicit the normal eﬀort
from unskilled workers. Hence, an increase in θ pivots the fair wage constraint outwards.
By alternatively looking at the inverse fair wage constraint, we have ∂ ˜ f/∂θ > 0, saying
that a higher rate of unemployment is needed to support a given ω if θ is higher.
In order to isolate the impact that θ variations have in our model, we look at two small
open economies that are identical in every respect but their preferences towards fairness.
The economy that has a high value for θ (θe) is labelled egalitarian, while the economy
with a low θ (θne) is referred to as non-egalitarian. Using ﬁgure 4 it is easily veriﬁed
that increasing θ, by rotating the fair wage constraint clockwise, rotates both NDIVI and
NDIVF clockwise as well. Hence, loosely speaking, a given endowment ratio is more likely
to lie above NDIVI and NDIVF and therefore lead to specialisation on more skill intensive
production in the egalitarian economy than in the non-egalitarian economy. This is so
because at each relative factor price the egalitarian economy has higher unemployment
of unskilled workers and therefore a higher employment ratio h. Hence, international
20fragmentation should more likely be beneﬁcial in the egalitarian economy.
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Figure 5: International fragmentation in egalitarian and non-egalitarian economies
This presumption can be substantiated by using the critical endowment ratio ¯ h∗ in-
troduced in the previous section.
Proposition 3. With hA 6= hY (and θ suﬃciently small) there is a non-empty interval of
endowment ratios for which international fragmentation leads to increased unemployment
in the non-egalitarian economy and to decreased unemployment in the egalitarian economy.
Proof. It has been shown above (in the proof to proposition 1) that ¯ h∗ is a function of θ,
assuming hA 6= hY . More speciﬁcally, in this case we have ∂¯ h∗/∂θ = −hA(∂ ˜ f/∂θ) < 0,
21and therefore ¯ h∗(θe) < ¯ h∗(θne), given θe < ωAZ. Hence, if ¯ h satisﬁes
¯ h ∈ (¯ h∗(θne),¯ h∗(θe)) (16)
international fragmentation increases unemployment in the non-egalitarian economy, while
it decreases unemployment in the egalitarian economy.
As unemployment is higher in the egalitarian economy, we ﬁnd that if ¯ h lies in the interval
speciﬁed in (16) international fragmentation leads to unemployment convergence between
the egalitarian and the non-egalitarian economy. At the same time, there is international
divergence in relative factor prices: In the egalitarian economy, international fragmentation
compresses the wage diﬀerential, whereas the wage diﬀerential is widened in the non-
egalitarian economy.19 Figure 5 illustrates these results for the case where hA > hY . The
construction of the critical endowment ratios follows the reasoning described in section 2.
In order to avoid clutter, the NDIV cones have been omitted.
To conclude this section we brieﬂy discuss the borderline case where the skill intensities
of A and Y are identical, and which has been excluded in proposition 3. The intuition that
a higher preference for fairness increases unemployment ceteris paribus, and thereby makes
specialisation on skill intensive goods more likely, applies to this case as well. Therefore,
the above statement that fragmentation is “more likely” to decrease unemployment in the
egalitarian economy is still valid. However, proposition 3 does not apply here because,
from proposition 1, ¯ h∗ is not unique if hA = hY .
4 International Fragmentation and the Welfare State
In the derivation of the fair wage constraint (10), it has been assumed that unemploy-
ment beneﬁts are equal to zero. For the analysis in the previous sections, this is just
19This is consistent with empirical evidence that in rather non-egalitarian economies (like the U.S. or
the U.K.) the wage diﬀerential has widened in the process of international fragmentation. See our short
discussion on this issue in the introductory section. However, our theoretical insights make clear that
the respective wage and employment eﬀects may be quite diﬀerent in egalitarian Western and Northern
European countries, for which, to the best of our knowledge, conclusive empirical evidence on the factor
market eﬀects of foreign outsourcing is so far missing.
22a convenient normalisation that does not involve any loss in generality as long as it is
made sure that unemployment beneﬁts are lower than the wage rate. In this section, we
introduce strictly positive unemployment beneﬁts the size of which is intended to capture
in a rudimentary way the size of the welfare state. This allows us to address an issue
raised by many European policy makers, namely the argument that globalisation in the
form of international fragmentation makes the generous welfare state of Western European
economies unsustainable. According to this argument, high unemployment beneﬁts, by
leading to higher wages, foster international fragmentation and thereby lead to domestic
job losses. The policy aimed at beneﬁting unskilled workers might therefore end up harm-
ing them. However, as pointed out above, the intuitively appealing idea that international
fragmentation and outsourcing of labour-intensive parts of the production chain imply
higher unemployment rates may be misleading from a general equilibrium perspective. It
is therefore warranted to analyse the eﬀect of unemployment beneﬁts more formally.
Assuming that unemployment beneﬁts are a fraction γ ∈ (0,1) of the wage for each
skill group, we can reformulate the fair wages of unskilled and skilled workers and obtain
w∗
L = θwH + (1 − θ)[(1 − UL) + γUL]wL (17)
w∗
H = θwL + (1 − θ)[(1 − UH) + γUH]wH, (18)
according to (5) and (6), respectively. And, accounting for (7) to (9), the fair wage
constraint, which for γ = 0 was determined by (10), becomes
ω = g(U,θ,γ) ≡
θ
θ + (1 − θ)(1 − γ)U
. (19)
Comparing (10) and (19), we can conclude that a higher replacement ratio γ has qual-
itatively similar implications as a higher preference for an egalitarian wage schedule in
that both pivot the fair wage constraint outwards. Formally, from (19) we get ∂g/∂γ > 0,
which says that given the rate of unemployment a marginal increase in the replacement
ratio increases the value of ω which is needed in order to elicit the normal eﬀort from un-
skilled workers. Conversely, a higher rate of unemployment is needed to support a given
ω if the replacement ratio is higher.
23In writing down equations (17) to (19) it is implicitly assumed that the ﬁnancing of
unemployment beneﬁts does not impact on the determination of the fair wage of unskilled
workers. This is correct under two alternative scenarios. Either the idea of workers on
what constitutes a fair wage is related to gross wages, not net wages, or unemployment
beneﬁts are ﬁnanced by a proportional tax on all workers, with the replacement ratio γ
deﬁned in terms of net wages. However, if workers’ fair wage idea relates to net wages
and the tax is levied to diﬀerent extents on workers of diﬀerent skill (i.e. income) levels,
the analysis has to be modiﬁed. Consider the extreme case where unemployment beneﬁts
are paid for by a tax on skilled workers only. The government budget constraint in this
case becomes twHH = γwLU ¯ L, which can be rewritten as t = γωU/¯ h. Ceteris paribus,
an increase in the replacement ratio decreases the net wage of skilled workers (1 − t)wH.
If the net wage enters the determination of w∗
L in (17), the modiﬁed fair wage constraint
is given by20










It is now readily checked that ∂ω/∂γ > 0 ⇔ ¯ h > θ/(1−θ), and therefore the above result
goes through if the relative number of skilled workers is suﬃciently large: With many
skilled workers, a given increase in the replacement ratio is accompanied by a relatively
small increase in the wage tax, and therefore the net eﬀect on the fair wage is positive.
Given the rather extreme assumptions needed to reverse the result ∂ω/∂γ > 0, it is
justiﬁed to work with fair wage constraint (19) instead of (190) in the following analysis,
by assuming a proportional tax on all workers.
A high value of γ may consequently imply specialisation on skill-intensive goods X and
Y for a country that would have specialised in the production of labour-intensive goods in
the presence of a low replacement ratio. In direct analogy to our discussion of θ diﬀeren-
tials above, international fragmentation in sector Y may then have beneﬁcial employment
20Consider wL = w
∗
L and substitute t = γωU/¯ h into wL = θwH(1 − t) + (1 − θ)[(1 − UL + γUL)]wL.
Rearranging terms and using UL = U gives wL
￿
1 − (1 − θ)[(1 − U) + γU] + θγU/¯ h
￿
= θwH, which can
ultimately be transformed into (19
0). Furthermore, we can note that (19
0) implies (1 − t)wH > wL. This
conﬁrms that the fair wage constraint is binding for unskilled (but not for skilled) workers.
24eﬀects in the high γ country and detrimental employment eﬀects in the country with a low
replacement ratio. Because of the analogy between γ and θ in the present model, ﬁgure
5 can also be used to discuss the issue of unemployment beneﬁts, where a decrease in γ
rotates the fair wage constraint counter-clockwise. Hence, there is an interval of endow-
ment ratios for which international fragmentation increases unemployment in a country
with low unemployment beneﬁts while it would decrease unemployment in an otherwise
identical economy with a high replacement ratio.21
While the analysis so far has revealed similarities in the eﬀects of θ and γ in the present
model, an important diﬀerence lies in the fact that γ is a policy variable. Therefore, it
is meaningful to discuss the eﬀect of varying it, given the organisation of production.
This is to what we turn next.22 Under diversiﬁcation (i.e. production of either XY , Y Z,
XA or AZ) reductions of γ that do not change the production mix leave relative factor
prices constant and decrease the rate of unemployment. Conversely, in the case of full
specialisation on Y or A, a marginal decrease in γ has no impact on the unemployment
rate but increases the skill premium. Finally, reductions in the replacement ratio that are
suﬃciently large to impact on the mix of goods being produced reduce the unemployment
rate and increase the skill premium.
To compare the eﬀects of a γ change under integrated production with the respective
eﬀects under international fragmentation, let us focus on the case of diversiﬁed production
before and after the variation in γ. For the comparison, we deﬁne in analogy to section 2
the inverse fair wage constraint
U = ˜ g(ω,θ,γ) ≡
θ




according to (19). In view of our discussion above we can distinguish two cases, namely
21This result oﬀers an economic intuition behind the observation that a country like Italy, with relatively
low unemployment beneﬁt entitlements, suﬀered from an increase of unemployment in the globalization
process of the 1990s, while countries like Belgium or Denmark, with generous compensation schemes,
experienced a decline in their unemployment rates.
22In principle, one could imagine that γ and θ interact, rather than being treated as independent pa-
rameters as in the present paper. See Alesina and Angeletos (2004) for an example where the preference
for fairness explains cross-country diﬀerences in the choice of redistributive policies.
25small γ changes that leave the pattern of production unaﬀected and γ reforms that have
an impact on the output mix. Let us ﬁrst consider γ variation, which does not aﬀect the
production pattern. If the country produces two goods (XY , Y Z, XA or AZ), the ﬁrst







taking into account that relative factor prices are constant as long as production remains
diversiﬁed on the same set of goods. The unemployment eﬀect in (21) depends on the size of
γ and the unemployment rate: the more generous the unemployment compensation scheme
and the higher the (pre-reform) unemployment rate, the more eﬀective is a marginal
reduction of the replacement ratio.23
Consider next changes in the replacement ratio that lead to a switch in the output
mix. If production is diversiﬁed before and after the change in γ (i.e., if there is a switch
from XY to Y Z and from XA to AZ, respectively), it turns out that reducing γ has
a stronger relative wage eﬀect and a smaller unemployment eﬀect under fragmentation.
While the result on comparison of the relative wage eﬀects is easily veriﬁed by inspecting
the diﬀerence in slopes of the respective Hicksian composite unit value isoquants in ﬁgure
5, the result on the relative strength of the unemployment eﬀects is less obvious – and
perhaps more surprising. To see why it must hold, observe that for a given value of
γ a switch from XY production to XA production decreases unemployment, while a
switch from Y Z production to AZ production increases unemployment. Combining this
observation with the fact that a γ-induced move to the less skill intensive production mix
under a given regime (fragmentation/pre-fragmentation) decreases unemployment, we can
deduce that the unemployment-reducing eﬀect of a given decline in γ is less pronounced
under fragmented production. Hence, in contrast to perceived wisdom, in a world with
internationally fragmented production reductions in unemployment beneﬁts may lose part
of their eﬀectiveness in mitigating the unemployment problem.
Of course, a change of the replacement ratio may also have an impact on the number of
23The elasticity of the unemployment rate with respect to the replacement ratio follows from (21) as
γ/(γ − 1), and is therefore independent of the unemployment rate.
26production processes undertaken at home. Moreover, since the two NDIV cones (NDIV I
and NDIV F, respectively) are not congruent, a certain γ-reduction can change the pat-
tern of integrated production but leave the pattern of fragmented production unaﬀected.
Also the opposite may be true. It has been elaborated above that for some parameter
values (with full specialisation on Y or A) a marginal reduction of γ has no eﬀect on the
employment level, while for other parameter values (with diversiﬁcation on XY , Y Z, XA
or AZ) a marginal decline of γ mitigates the unemployment problem. Overall, no general
result can be derived on whether reforms of the unemployment compensation system are
more eﬀective under integrated or fragmented production. However, our analysis makes
clear that γ-changes, which lead from diversiﬁcation on skill-intensive production to di-
versiﬁcation on labour-intensive production, deﬁnitely exhibit lower employment eﬀects in
the case of international fragmentation.
Finally, as the position of the fair wage constraint is jointly determined by the prefer-
ence for fairness and the level of unemployment beneﬁts, the model illustrates that even
substantial reductions in unemployment beneﬁts may render it impossible for an egal-
itarian economy (“Europe”) to reach the low unemployment rates of a less egalitarian
economy (“America”).
5 Concluding Remarks
The public debate in industrialised economies on the international fragmentation of pro-
duction is mainly driven by the fear of domestic job-losses. In contrast, the academic
literature so far has analysed the eﬀects of international fragmentation using a theoretical
framework in which the assumption of competitive labour markets leads to full employ-
ment in equilibrium. Therefore, the concerns of the general public cannot be addressed
in the standard model. In this paper, we have tried to bridge the gap between the policy
debate and the theoretical analysis of international fragmentation by using a framework
where labour market imperfections lead to involuntary unemployment in equilibrium.
Applying a novel diagrammatic tool that builds on the well-known Lerner-Pearce dia-
gram, we have shown how the employment eﬀects of international fragmentation are jointly
27determined by relative factor endowments, the skill intensity of the component for which
production is retained domestically, preferences towards wage equality and the level of
unemployment beneﬁts. Contrary to common views but in line with earlier ﬁndings in the
academic literature, our model suggests that international fragmentation and outsourcing
of labour intensive production processes do not necessarily harm unskilled workers. In
particular, if home production is skill intensive, international fragmentation mitigates the
unemployment problem and at the same time reduces the skill premium. In our model,
there are three possible reasons for a high skill intensity of domestic production: A high
relative skill endowment, a high preference for fairness, and high unemployment beneﬁts.
While for a given skill intensity of domestic production the level of unemployment clearly
depends on which of these three reasons applies, the impact of fragmentation on unem-
ployment does not depend on it. Therefore, fragmentation can lower unemployment in
economies with high or low unemployment rates.
Finally, we have shown that the eﬀectiveness of policy reforms that scale down un-
employment compensation schemes may be inﬂuenced by whether there is international
fragmentation of production or not. In particular, when lowering unemployment compen-
sation leads the economy to move to a more labour intensive production mix, such policy
reforms may exhibit smaller employment eﬀects under fragmented production than under
integrated production. This result should be of particular interest to policy makers who
redesign the size and structure of the welfare state with the aim to make it sustainable in
a global economy.
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